真係傻人來的, 讀咗咁多書都唔明, 以為低息就可以迫人去消費或借錢投資, 當然要先預計將來走勢去設定自己財務, 而唔係只睇利息低就去投資有風險野或消費 !
在經濟轉差時, 無儲蓄, 唔通食西北風呀 ?
finance.yahoo.com
So, let's start with the basic premise: Consumers are not economists.
This means that normal people
who have a job and then decide what to do with their hard-earned money
often make decisions that economists don't expect.
The latest example is when, how
much, and why people save money. In short, too much saving means not
enough spending means a lack of aggregate demand in the economy, the
thinking goes. "Secular stagnation" is another term that might apply.
In a note to clients last week,
Deutsche Bank's Binky Chadha looked at the relationship between interest
rates and savings rates, finding that — of course — consumers aren't
exactly acting the way the economists at the Federal Reserve might
expect.
Namely, people are saving money
despite low interest rates when many economists expected or hoped these
folks would spend that money to buy stuff or put it in assets that
actually earn some return.
Here's Deutsche Bank on how an
economist might think zero-interest-rate policies might pass through to
consumers (emphasis ours):
If households save to accumulate a target level of wealth, either to live off in retirement or to bequeath, then
an increase in wealth (because say equity markets rise) will see a
lower required savings rate; and vice versa with declines in wealth
raising the savings rate. In
turn, a rise in the savings rate, or what is the same thing a fall in
the consumption rate, will lower aggregate demand in the economy. This dependence of the savings rate on wealth is widely recognized, including by various members of the FOMC.
This is sort of the "savings glut" idea that people like former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke have talked about in the years since the financial crisis.
Let's consider, then, who benefits most when interest rates are low: borrowers.
So we've got governments and
businesses primarily benefiting from low interest rates as opposed to
households — read: consumers. And as Deutsche Bank notes, households in
the US have significantly more assets than liabilities.
This means that while households benefit from a secondary effect of low
interest rates, which has seen things like stock prices and real-estate
prices rebound, the primary effect of low interest rates, which lowers
the cost of borrowing money and servicing existing debts, matters a lot
less.
So what low interest rates do is
allow governments and businesses to borrow money more cheaply now and,
for those who have already borrowed, lower the cost of their outstanding
debts through refinancings by pushing their liabilities out to future
dates at current prevailing interest rates.
And so again, this disproportionately favors businesses and governments rather than consumers.
And while there has been a boom
in mortgage refinancings — in addition to households being able to
obtain new mortgages at lower rates — households simply have more assets
than liabilities.
The benefits of low interest rates, the primary "blunt tool" of monetary policy, is primarily passed to non-households.
But aside from potentially lower
mortgage costs, the only other thing consumers really notice about low
interest rates is that they get less back from money they park in the
bank rather than spend, invest, or do other things with.
Now, for years ahead of the
financial crisis, this wasn't really a problem and consumers acted as
expected, as seen in this chart from Deutsche Bank. Interest rates were
falling; stock and home prices were rising, bringing up household assets
to gross domestic product; and so as a result people saved less as they
believed in their ability to spend money now and have enough for
retirement.
This, then, reversed, as expected, in the financial crisis and people started saving as asset prices declined. But the continued saving of consumers is the puzzle here for central bankers.
And thus we arrive at consumers not being or acting like economists.
Now, this isn't something economists haven't noticed. But what does still seem to be a problem for policy makers is getting households out of this habit.
In other words, central banks have seemingly failed at reducing the savings glut.
And the really discouraging part is that Chadha seems to find that low interest rates increase
the savings rate because the increase in savings seems largely a
manifestation of a fear of not having enough money in the future.
So what we've got here is
self-reinforcing behavior: I need to save more money today to have
enough money tomorrow if the amount my money put away today grows by
is 0%.
As a result, households have bought bonds — which are lower-yielding but relatively "safer" assets — like crazy ...
... and stayed away from stocks, despite the fact that bonds and pure
savings accounts are yielding extremely little — on a nominal basis —
relative to history.
So again, what central bankers
wanted was a low savings rate to stoke consumer spending. But as
Deutsche Bank outlines, here's what actually happens:
If as
the empirical evidence indicates strongly, the household savings rate
is driven by a desire to accumulate wealth, it stands to reason that the
rate of return on it should impact the savings rate. The
rate of return determines the size of the flow income at any level of
wealth, so lower rates require a higher wealth target to attain the same
target income; and the rate of return affects the speed with which
wealth targets can be reached through the compounding of returns, so
lower rates of return require more savings to reach the same wealth
target.
The kicker from Deutsche Bank, which as Bloomberg's Luke Kawa characterized basically makes the entire post-crisis central-banking project all for naught, is rough:
While
a number of arguments can be made for why countercyclical monetary
policy in the US through lower rates is supportive of economic growth,
the encouragement of a lower savings rate (higher consumption rate) is
not one of them. Indeed the
empirical evidence is strongly to the contrary: lower rates look to be
lowering the consumption rate and lowering aggregate demand.
About a month ago, we chronicled how consumers ended up spending more on gas —
despite lower gas prices — right before the financial crisis because of
how they budgeted their money, viewing it as committed to certain
purchases rather than seeing it as truly fungible.
And over the last several months, Nobel laureate Robert Shiller has talked about how
it is not our hopes for the future but our anxieties that are driving
up stock prices, another clear sign of irrationality among actors many
economists assume are acting in a rational manner.
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