www.armstrongeconomics.com
I am writing from Frankfurt here for meetings ahead of the chaos
awaiting the May elections. In Frankfurt, while the economy is clearly
slowing, the financial capital is booming. New skyscrapers are rising to
join those of Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, DZ Bank, Helaba and others on
Frankfurt’s skyline. This is another sign that there is a disparity
between the financial world and the main street.
Nevertheless, behind the facade is a weakening banking sector that
the ECB seems to be inspiring. Forcing negative interest rates where the
banks must pay the ECB 0.4%, their rate of return on equity has fallen
into a crash mode. The German banks’ average earnings have dwindled from
once 4% back in 2010 to barely 1% into last year. Deutsche Bank, the
biggest, tried to compete with Wall Street and paid the price.
After four years of losses, finally, in 2018, Deutsche Bank made its
first annual profit which was just a 0.4% return on equity.
As always, politics enters the game rather than logic. The German
government wanted to see a Commerzbank and Deutsche Bank merge and
offered some undisclosed assistance. That assistance would most likely
be writing off a portion of the 15% the German government still owns of
Commerzbank, which is the legacy of a bail-out and a merger with the
stricken Dresdner Bank back in 2008-2009. The government does not own
shares in Deutsche Bank.
The books of Commerzbank show the same problems as in Deutsche Bank
so a merger between the two does not appear to solve any crisis. There
are in addition rumors that Commerzbank is being considered by both
French and Italian banks for a takeover. The prospects of a merger with
Deutsche Bank from a non-German bank may be too ambitious politically
speaking.
The German government is coming under great stress for the two
biggest banks are not really very healthy at this moment and suitors are
foreign – not German. Deutsche Bank could be merged with the French
BNP, but that would be a loss of pride. Meanwhile, the management at
Deutsche Bank would prefer a deal with Switzerland’s UBS. A
previous German bank, HVB of Munich, was taken over by Italy’s
UniCredit. That was one embarrassment politicians seem reluctant to
repeat. The bail-in policy was devised because politicians did not want
to have to contribute to bank failures they saw as inevitable in
Southern Europe. To have foreign banks eying up German banks, the pillar
of the EU, somehow strike a deep blow into the political heart of the
EU.
The ECB’s negative interest rate policy is seriously harming European
banks yet they cannot figure out an alternative without having to admit
there is a major flaw in the entire structural system in Europe.
Forcing banks to pay the ECB to deposit reserves is really absurd.
What is most interesting is that the emotions are running high over
issues such as BREXIT and the Euro Crisis. It appears that analysts from
major institutions are not allowed to discuss anything to do with debt
consolidation. This appears to be off the table for discussion. The
proposals to create a Euro Bond are separate and distinct leaving the
current national debts to be held by each member state. That hardly
removes the threat of one member failure impacting the whole of the EU.
Meanwhile, there is a silent move to reduce exposure to Italian debt
held by non-Italian institutions. There remains a concern that Italy
could possibly follow Britain. There is growing respect that even the
hint of such a possibility that Italy would withdraw from the Eurozone
can result in a sharp decline in the value of Italian debt even if they
never move to actually exit the Eurozone. Italy was one of the original
founders of the Euro.
Overall, there appears to be a general consensus that everyone should
just keep the Euro at all costs. However, without major structural
reforms, it is hard to see how the problems will not take on a life of
itself. The refusal to consider a debt consolidation leaves the Euro
vulnerable to the politics of each member with rising popular trends in
politics.
The Eurozone’s third-largest economy, Italy, already has debts of
about €2.3 trillion euros, which is the equivalent to 132% of its GDP.
However, it takes more than 4% of Italy’s GDP is now being used to
service its debt load and this is with historically low interest rates.
There are concerns behind the curtail that Italy can play a game of
chicken. If they decide to leave the Eurozone, what about all the
Italian debt held by the ECB? Who will lose? The Italians, Brussels or
the financial markets as a whole?
The lira was the official unit of currency in Italy until January 1, 1999, when it was replaced by the euro (euro coins and notes were not introduced until 2002). Old lira-denominated currency ceased to be legal tender on February 28, 2002. Beginning on January 1, 1999, all bonds and other forms of government debt by Eurozone nations were denominated in Euros. The value of the Euro, which started at USD 1.1686 on December 31st, 1998, rose during its first day of trading, Monday, January 4th, 1999, closing at approximately US$1.18. The Euro replaced the former European Currency Unit (ECU) at a ratio of 1:1 (US$1.1743).
Converting its national debt at 1.18, only resulted in economic chaos
that devasted Italy. Whatever it owed previously in lira was suddenly
now Euro. They experience their national debt doubling in real value the
same as if you borrowed in Swiss franc for a mortgage that saw the
Swiss franc double in value. With the Euro trading in the 1.13 level,
it is finally below the original conversion rate but even that ignores
all the costs of services at high price levels.
By no means did Italy benefit from joining the Eurozone. To
participate in the new currency, member states had to meet strict
criteria such as a budget deficit of less than 3% of their GDP, a debt
ratio of less than 60% of GDP, low inflation, and interest rates close
to the EU average. Both France and Germany have been over that 60%
level. France’s debt is currently at 97% of GDP while Germany is at 64%
of GDP. Italy is 138% of GDP and Greece is at 178%. The Netherlands is
at 56.7% of GDP, Austria is at 78.4%, Belgium is at 103% while Spain is
at 98%. For comparison, the USA stands at 78%. This strict criterion has
really failed to work and it was all mandatory simply because they
refused to consolidate the national debts from the outset.
Greece failed to meet the criteria and was excluded from
participating on January 1st, 1999. Eventually, Greece joined the Euro
with the help of manipulations by Goldman Sachs on June 19th, 2000 when
the drachma was fixed at 340.75.
This tour here in Europe is most interesting for the concerns are
rising and there is a clear flight from Italian debt. Some of the most
conservative portfolios in Europe have raised their exposure to the
dollar from 5% to 30% which was attributed to the significant rally in
the Dow since December. We even have central banks buying gold in search
of diversification and a hedge against the uncertainty on the horizon
come May. Needless to say, we have selected Rome for this year’s midterm
WEC for this is the center of political attention behind the curtain.
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