文章說, 高盛成日同客對賭, 所以佢預測唔可以盡信 !
所以買實金實銀唔係睇金銀價格短線波動, 而係是一種長線收集, 當是買件珠寶來收藏等價格的升值 !
點解實金實銀是避險資產和安全過日元 ?
而點解股票唔可以唔理買入價長線買入收股息 ?
因為實金實銀還有純材料的價值, 就算報價跌去零, 你手中還有塊金或銀, 但如果股票價值去到零, 你手中可能連一張紙都無, 想用來當柴燒都唔得 ! 呢個就是買股票和買實金實銀的分別 !
www.investopedia.comIn the opening weeks of 2016, gold has been surging in a manner not seen for a long time. The week of Feb. 8 saw the biggest one-week gain in the metal since the 2008 financial crisis. Analysts pointed to increasing fears over the stock market, the slowing Chinese economy and the possibility of a rebound in oil prices as the reasons behind the surge, which pushed the price of gold up over $1,200 an ounce, its highest level since June 2015. Even The Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (NYSE: GS), which had been bearish on gold throughout 2015, turned bullish for a moment, and then it was bearish just a week later. This latest flip-flop by Goldman Sachs has many in the investment world rolling their eyes as the investment firm tries to win on both sides of the market.
The Anatomy of a Goldman Sachs Flip Flop
Ever since gold peaked above $1,800 in 2012, its price trend has been down with intermittent rallies. Prior to this month’s surge, the last time gold rallied was last year at this time when it surged briefly to just below $1,300. Soon after, gold peaked below $1,800 in 2013, Goldman Sachs turned bearish on the metal and, from a long-term perspective, it has remained so. But, Goldman Sachs also makes short-term forecasts for the direction of gold prices. A short-term forecast is generally for a period of three to six months, during which the price of gold can be expected to rise or fall. These short-term forecasts are for the benefit of gold traders, of which Goldman Sachs is one, who try to capitalize on price fluctuations.For example, in January 2015, as gold was rallying, Goldman Sachs upgraded its forecast to an average price of $1,262 in 2015, with an expectation that its price would rise in the near term. Shortly after that, gold prices tumbled. In July, Goldman Sachs issued a downgrade indicating that gold prices should fall below $1,000 by the end of the year. Immediately after that, gold rallied through the middle of October. After the price of gold started to decline, Goldman Sachs reiterated its downgrade in November. A month later, the price of gold began to increase, leading up to the January/February 2016 surge.
On Feb. 10, 2016, in the midst of a torrid surge in gold prices, Goldman Sachs changed its short-term forecast again, stating, “there’s scope for the gold price to extend much higher over time.” The next day, gold prices fell. But, just one week later, Goldman Sachs made an about-face, telling investors that there is no real basis for the fears (China's economy, low oil prices, bank risk due to negative interest rates) that are pushing gold prices up and that the price should recede in the near term. Gold prices then proceeded to rally following that forecast. That would seem like a very extraordinary change in thinking in such a short period of time, but it was nothing compared to April of 2013 when it changed its forecast four times during the month.
What's Behind the Flip Flops?
It's easy to conclude that Goldman Sachs is not very good at short-term forecasting. However, many cynics have concluded that the company knows exactly what it is doing. They will remind you that Goldman Sachs is an investment bank and a market maker that very actively trades securities for its own account. The company generates a massive amount of revenue from this trading.Goldman Sachs also has a very prominent research department that issues research reports to its clients, providing them with its best thinking on the direction of the markets. These reports, along with other communications that include forecasts, are very influential with the potential to move the price of a security in one direction or another. It would make sense that Goldman Sachs wants to help its clients make money in the markets. But, the cynics will remind you that Goldman Sachs makes money on the trading activity of its clients regardless of whether they make money.
Alongside that thinking is the more sinister theory that for Goldman Sachs to make money in its own trading account, its clients have to lose money. In other words, if Goldman Sachs’ forecasts direct its clients one way, it can make money by doing the opposite. With the massive amount of trading it can conduct in any one commodity, it can make millions on a brief directional shift when it knows investors will move in a certain way. For example, when it changed its forecast several times in April 2013, within two weeks after its last forecast that downgraded gold again, it covered its short position.
Critics have been accusing Goldman Sachs and the other large investment banks of such shenanigans for a while. In this most recent flip-flop, it could be a case of the right arm of Goldman Sachs not knowing what the left arm is doing. It was the technical analysts of Goldman Sachs that suddenly turned bullish short-term, and it was the commodities research analysts who issued the downgrade the very next week. That could explain the flip-flop, or maybe it could provide the rationale for it as the Goldman Sachs gold traders take advantage.
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